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THE SUPREME COURT'S
UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO
CLARIFY WHEN SCHOOL BOARDS
HAVE COMPLIED WITH
DESEGREGATION DECREES: BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF OKLAHOMA
CITY v. DO WELL
The notion of equality of individuals, a cornerstone of American society, is heralded by the Declaration of Independence and
guaranteed to all by the United States Constitution.' To achieve
the ideal of equality, particularly equality of opportunity,
America's sociologically diverse and multi-ethnic peoples must not
be segregated. 2 Hence, to promote the success of society and its
1 See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). It provides in relevant part:
"that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." The
United States Constitution, which evolved out of the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, provides equal protection under the laws of the United States. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge, the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
Id.; Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law, Desegregation of the Nations Public Schools. A
Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, at viii (Aug. 1976) [hereinafter Fulfilling the Letter] (all United States citizens should have equal chance); see, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (opportunity to attain education fosters success); Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1703 (1986)
(United States citizens should have chance to develop their skills and be rewarded for their
development).
' See'Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (integrated school system, established by rational means and
understood by parents and children, will promote society's success); Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Courts' Abandonment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 7, 12 (1984) (judges should presume that schools would be naturally integrated absent state fostered segregation); Note, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious
Remedy for Neighborhood Transition, 90 YALE LJ. 377 (1980) (examines social science evi-
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citizens, education-"the very foundation of good citizenship"'-should be equally available to all, and should be integrated.4 Since public schools play a critical role in educating contemporary society, 5 the affirmative desegregation of these schools
will allow America's children to achieve a desirable sense of community, in keeping with the fulfillment of equal opportunity. 6 In a
dence on integration of communities). See also

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY

953 (2d ed. 1970).

Integrate means "to make whole or complete by adding or bringing together parts . .. to
put or bring (parts) together into a whole." Id.
I Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See, e.g., Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299,
302 (5th Cir. 1971) (education is "vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society") (quoting
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961)); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (education is "priceless
commodity"), vacated, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 608, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 618, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (1971) ("[W]e
are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treatment of it as a 'fundamental interest.' "), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 907 (1977); D. FELLMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND EDUCATION, at xi (3d ed. 1976)
(promotion of education serves America's general welfare).
See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 472 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Implementation of desegregation proposal would have no black schools and no white
schools "but just schools." Id. (quoting Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 442 (1968)). The goal of a desegregation remedy is "a unitary, non-racial system of
public education." Green, 391 U.S. at 436. "[I]n the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place-separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988) . "The Congress declares it
to be the policy of the United States that-(l) all children enrolled in public schools are
entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex or national
origin." Id. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (right to education
not explicitly mentioned in Constitution) with J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 735 (2d ed. 1983) (recognition of right to education embodied in concept of
liberty recognized by Constitution). See generally R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWNTHIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 4 (1984) (blacks attending segregated schools
have impaired educational development).
I See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (education important to our democratic society); Piper
v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 673, 226 P. 926, 930 (1924) ("[Tlhe common
schools are doorways opening into chambers of science, art, and the learned professions, as
well as into fields of industrial and commercial activities."); J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE
COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2 (2d ed. 1985) (public schools are principal dispensers
of knowledge and learning); E. REUTTER, JR., THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 1 (3d ed.
1985). "The public education system in the United States is an instrumentality for carrying
out a function that society has determined to be a desirable one-the education of all the
children of all the people." Id.
' See, e.g., Estes v. NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (ethnically
diverse public schools help children assimilate into our pluralistic society); Wright, 407 U.S.
at 460 (district court may enjoin desegregation proposal that impedes dismantling dual segregated system); Green, 391 U.S. at 438 (calling for prompt and effective disestablishment
of dual school system); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968) (desegregation plan must be shown to be affirmatively converting system into unitary non-discriminatory system); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 513 (C.D. Cal.
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decision that will affect countless desegregation cases pending
across the country,7 the Supreme Court, in Board of Education v.
Dowell,' held that a federal court's supervision of a school board
which was ordered to desegregate ends when the court decides
the board has complied with the desegregation decree.9 Thereafter, control of the composition of the school and its facilities can
be relinquished to local school authorities, 0 subject as always, to
the mandate of equal protection."
Dowell, and its complex procedural history, has spanned a period of thirty years. 2 In 1961, seven years after Brown v. Board of
1970) (integration provides positive educational benefits to prepare children to live in
multi-racial society). But see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 132
(1978) ("[N]o policy that a court can order, and a school board, a city or even the state has
the capacity to put into effect, will in fact result in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public schools.").
' See Supreme Guessing Game: Integrated, But Watched Ever After, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1990,
at 1 (Dowell decision expected to affect hundreds of desegregation cases). Cf. HOGAN, supra
note 5, at 11 (approximately 52,167 state and federal cases have affected education from
1789 through 1984).
s 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
See id. at 638: accord Wright, 407 U.S. at 479 ("Judicial power ends when a dual school
system has ceased to exist.") (Burger, J., dissenting). See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 439 U.S. 1348, 1353 (1978) (school desegregation orders are very sensitive because
they restructure system of education); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218,
227-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (termination of desegregation decree fact specific to each case);
Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 728, 789-98 (1986) (discussing difficulties in deciding when court supervision is terminated in desegregation cases). But see Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 41, 43 (1986) (remedy imposed on school board for segregation of schools
does not disappear once school district is unitary).
to Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638; see Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 543 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); see also Note, Unitariness and Busing: Placing the
Burden of Prooffor ObtainingJudicial Review When a School Board Stops Busing, 92 DICK. L.
REV. 437, 460 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Unitariness and Busing] (public policy requires return of qualified control of schools to local boards); Note, The UnitarinessFinding and its
Effect on Mandatory DesegregationInjunctions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 551, 553 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The Unitariness Finding] (once local officials have complied with desegregation
decree, control of school system returns to them): cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
881-82 (1982) (local school boards have discretion in management of school affairs but
must comply with first amendment); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410
(1976) ("[l1ocal autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition"); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (same); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (same); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 543 (school boards will run
schools when all vestiges of de jure segregation are eradicated).
" Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638; see Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (fourteenth amendment protects citizens against state and its subdivisions, including boards of education).
" See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633.
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Education"3 declared "separate educational facilities inherently unequal,"1 4 respondent Robert Dowell, along with other black students, brought an action to end de jure segregation" in the
Oklahoma City public school system.16 In 1963, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ruled that
the Oklahoma City Board of Education's (the "Board") mere
statement of policy to desegregate was not enough to eliminate
vestiges of segregation or violations of constitutional rights17 and
ordered the Board to take "clear affirmative aggressive action to
bring about desegregation. 1 8 Finally, in 1972, after the Board
failed to devise a suitable desegregation plan, the district court ordered Oklahoma public schools to adopt the "Finger Plan" proposal submitted by the respondents.1 9
The Board functioned under the Finger Plan for five years, and
in 1977, the district court granted a motion to close the case. 0
However, in 1984, the Board adopted the Student Reassignment
Plan which, in effect, resegregated some schools.21 A year later, a
13 347 U.S. 438 (1954).
4

Id. at 495.

16See infra note 43 (de facto/de jure segregation distinction).
16 Dowell v. Oklahoma City Pub. Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427, 428 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
17 Dowell v. Oklahoma City Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 971, 976 (W.D. Okla. 1965),
affid, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
See id. at 982.
19 See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1273, affd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). The plan was developed by Dr. John Finger, a
consultant hired by the plaintiffs. Id. at 1259. Dr. Finger was a professor of education at
Rhode Island State University and an expert in the field of desegregation. See Dowell v.
Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). The
"Finger Plan" involved the restructuring of high school and junior high school attendance
zones so that no school had less than 15 percent or more than 30 percent black enrollment. See Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1267-68. Black students in grades one through four were
bused to formerly all-white schools. Id. at 1268. White fifth grade students were then
bused to fifth grade centers. Id. Children in kindergarten were allowed to attend their
neighborhood schools, despite the fact that the schools would then be segregated, in order
to have the security of being near home. Id.; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971) (transportation may be excluded as desegregation tool
when young childrens' health or educational process is impeded by time or distance of
travel); Estes v. NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 442 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Court recognized that concern for very young childrens' health and welfare may exclude them from
desegregation busing plans) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 31).
20 See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, No. 9452, slip op. App., at 174-76 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18,
1977).
" See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1552 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795
F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). The Student Reassignment Plan
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class action suit was filed on behalf of black school children which
included a motion to reopen the Dowell case.2" The district court
refused to reopen the case, claiming' the faculty and student body
were integrated. 3
The court of appeals reversed, holding that when the district
court found the school system to be unitary,2" it merely ended active court supervision, although the Board would still have to adhere to the constitutional mandate of desegregation.2 5 On remand, the district court found the new plan constitutional because
the requisite discriminatory intent to segregate on the part of the
Board was not present. 26 Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed once more, holding that the district court had again found
that the school district was integrated. This finding released the
Board from court supervision despite any evidence that the circumstances underlying the issuance of the decree had substantially
changed.2" Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict which had arisen among the circuits in determineliminated compulsory busing for students in kindergarten through fourth grades. Id. All
fifth year centers, junior high schools, and high schools continued mandatory busing. Id. at
1552-53. Also, an equity officer was appointed to observe all of the schools to keep them
integrated. Id. at 1552.
" See id. at 1549. The petitioners claimed that the Oklahoma school system had not
attained "unitary" status and had consequently resegregated. Id. at 1549.
"2 See id. at 1556-57 (school board's Student Reassignment Plan [SRP] was constitutional
because it was not intentionally discriminatory).
"4 See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 111 S. Ct. 630, 636 (1991). "Courts have used the terms
'dual' to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students
by race, and 'unitary' to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance
with the command of the Constitution." Id.
25 See Dowell v. Oklahoma City Pub. Schools, 795 F.2d 1516, 1522-23 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) (school board's abandonment of Finger Plan without court
approval jeopardized plaintiffs' rights).
2 See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1515-16 (W.D. Okla. 1987), rev'd,
890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). The school system reflected
the demographics of the segregated residential areas. Id. at 1512-13. As a result, the district court concluded that supervision of the school system could be relinquished to local
authorities. Id. at 1526.
2 See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1491 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
630 (1991). The court of appeals looked at this case not as a desegregation case, but as a
case in equity and therefore applied injunctive remedies. Id. at 1486. See, e.g., United States
v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (first articulated standard to modify injunctive relief
granted); Beard, The Role of Res Judicata in Recognizing Unitary Status and TerminatingDesegregation Litigation: A Response to the Structural Injunction, 49 LA. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1989)
(desegregation litigation not exempt from same rules of civil procedure and substantive law
applicable in other types of litigation).
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ing school district compliance with desegregation decrees.28
The Supreme Court remanded the Dowell case to the district
court for a factual determination of whether the school district
complied with the desegregation decree.29 In offering direction to
the district court, the Court held that court supervision ends when
"the board complie[s] in good faith with the desegregation decree
...and the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated
to the extent practicable." 3 0 The Court further provided that
when considering vestiges of past segregation, the district court
should consider "not only . . student assignments, but . . . 'every
facet of school-operations, faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities.' "31 The Court thus concluded that
when a school district is released from a desegregation decree,
court authorization of new school policies and procedures is no
longer needed." However, the Court warned that school districts
remain subject to the mandate of the equal protection clause of
33
the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, was concerned with the
lack of guidance in the majority's opinion. 4 "[T]he inquiry it
commends to the District Court fails to recognize explicitly the
threatened reemergence of one-race schools as a relevant 'vestige'
of de jure segregation." 3 Justice Marshall believed that as long as
the conditions of segregation declared unconstitutional in Brown
persist, compliance with a desegregation order is not complete,
and consequently, the need for court supervision is not dispelled. 6 The dissent also criticized the majority's vague standard
28 See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990).
28 See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638 (Court remanded after holding that substantial compliance with district- court's decree was necessary before decree could be terminated).
Id.
IO
Id. (quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
2 Id. at 638.
22 See id.
24 See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, expressed his dissatisfaction with the vagueness and
relative mildness of the majority's standard, as compared to the Brown I standard, which
required the school district to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. Id.
28 Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
as See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall restated the court of appeal's finding
that feasible steps could be taken by the school board to eliminate one race schools. Id. He
concluded that the purposes of the desegregation decree had not been achieved. d.
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for determining achievement of compliance with a desegregation
decree."' The dissent believed that the majority's emphasis on operation in compliance with the fourteenth amendment would not
satisfactorily guarantee the elimination of vestiges of segregation.3 8 Justice Marshall stressed that the ultimate goal of a school
board is to "eliminate any condition that perpetuates the message
of racial inferiority inherent in the policy of state-sponsored
segregation." 9
This Comment will suggest that Dowell's standard for compliance with a desegregation order is vague and unworkable. It will
then discuss the conflict between the Fourth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits which Dowell was explicitly intended to resolve and will
examine how the decision has increased the confusion surrounding compliance with desegregation decrees. Finally, this Comment
will suggest that the adoption of the standard enunciated by the
First Circuit would more properly address the issues facing school
districts in decades to come.
I.

THE FOURTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS' APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE

In Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk,40 a case decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs challenged a post-unitary school board plan calling for the
end of mandatory busing.41 The court held that in order for a
31 See id. at 644. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although the Court asserted that the vestiges
of past discrimination should be eliminated, the dissent pointed out that the continued
majority of one race schools in the school district comprised such a vestige. Id.
See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). By placing emphasis on the equal protection clause
rather than on the effects of past discrimination, the dissent feared that the Court ignored
the stigmatic harm done to minority children through a message of racial inferiority. Id.
Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 648 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
40 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
41 Id. at 524. The plan was proposed in response to significant "white flight" and decreased parental involvement in education attributed to mandatory busing. See id. at 526
(experts concluded that busing led to both desegregated schools and declining white enrollment which would resegregate schools, if not discontinued); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 469 (1979) (Burger, J., concurring) (highly doubtful that busing
accomplishes desired goals); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 222 (1973) (busing
easier to implement in rural areas than in cities because of dense shifting populations, numerous schools, and traffic problems associated with metropolitan areas) (citing Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971)); Lee v. Macon City Bd. of
Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir. 1980). Several experienced educators stated that busing
would burden pupils, their parents, and the school system with serious time and transporta-
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school system to become unitary, "[afll aspects of public education must be freed from the vestiges of state sanctioned racial segregation .
"...42It also stated that the jurisdiction of the district
court terminates once unitariness is achieved.43
tion problems. Id. Black educators emphasized that any gains made by desegregation of the
early grades would be outweighed by the disadvantages of cross-town busing. Id. The stability gained from attending a school near home and family for several years, especially in
the presence of siblings and friends, was stated to be more important than desegregation.
Id.; see also Flax v. Potts, 864 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir. 1989) (end of busing would decrease "white flight" and stabilize residential integration).
"White flight" is a term used to describe the phenomenon of whites retreating from
schools or communities in order to resist desegregation. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 629 (1983). Instead of challenging integration directly, these white
parents react by transferring their children to private schools or by moving to other communities. Id. Most studies of "white flight" indicate that mandatory desegregation causes
many white students to leave their schools. See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a
Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARv. L. REV. 653, 663 n.66
(1987). But see Devins, supra note 2, at 13 (recommending standard which recognizes busing as preferred remedy but allows school board to show that busing is ineffective).
4, Riddick, 784 F.2d at 533 (emphasis added). Specifically, a school system's faculty, staff,
transportation practices, facilities, extracurricular activities and student assignments must
all be integrated before the school system as a whole would be deemed "unitary." See id.;
see also Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (setting forth standard for
assessing school district's unitariness).
"1 Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 535 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
938 (1986). In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's indefinite, and seemingly perpetual involvement in Dowell, the Fourth Circuit requires a court's jurisdiction to end at a fixed point in
time. Id. (once unitary system is achieved, district court's role ends); see also Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1976) (issue before Court was when court
desegregation decree should cease). Under the Fourth Circuit's approach, the plaintiffs
bear the burden of proving that the school board has intentionally discriminated in adopting the new plan. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537. "We agree ... that Swann and the cases that
follow, both in the Supreme Court and in the courts of appeals, require a plaintiff to prove
discriminatory intent on the part of the school board of a unitary school system." Id.
The court emphasized that its holding only applies to systems which have successfully
uprooted all vestiges of de jure, as opposed to de facto, segregation and have thus been
declared "unitary." See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 565 (1974)
(private infringement of individual rights does not implicate fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958) (Constitution protects individuals from state action only); Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ.,
745 F.2d 324, 333 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to remedy desegregation problems caused by
demographic and individual prejudices); Rosson, Busing in Unitary School Districts:A Board's
Right to Modify the Plan, 35 W. EDuc. L. REP. 607 (1987) [hereinafter Rosson, Busing in
Unitary School Districts]. Only de jure segregation is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Id. This type of segregation is always caused by governmental action, but not all
governmental action that separates people by race is de jure segregation. Id. Sometimes
governmental plans do not intentionally discriminate based on race, but nevertheless have
a segregatory effect. Id. This is known as defacto segregation. Id. Defacto segregation may
also result from private acts of citizens such as their choice of residence. Id. Unlike dejure
segregation, defacto segregation is not illegal and does not create a duty to desegregate. Id.
Riddick, 784 F.2d at 543 ("Our holding is a limited one, applicable only to those school
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In Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education,4" the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit proposed a standard5
distinct from those adopted by the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.4
Spangler involved an appeal by the Board of Education of
Pasadena City from the denial of its motion to end ten years of
court supervision over its school system." The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the Fourth Circuit's position that a court's jurisdiction must end once the school system is declared "unitary." 47
However, Spangler did little to clarify the law as to when a court's
jurisdiction will come to an end and merely adopted the vague
three-part test previously espoused by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley."8
systems which have succeeded in eradicating all vestiges of de jure segregation."). If the
plaintiffs failed to establish discriminatory intent, their action would fail and the school
board would continue to operate the educational system without the intervention of the
federal courts. See id. But see Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 646 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (result in desegregation cases should be same even if segregation is
caused by decisions of private individuals); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 761 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (no constitutional difference between de jure and de facto
segregation).
Riddick has been criticized for placing the burden of proof on the plaintiffs after a finding of unitariness as too heavy a burden because it is extremely difficult for the plaintiff to
prove intent. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Decisions resting on the Court's impression of the
subjective intent of the school board will be "fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious." Id. Such a standard will provide inadequate protection from discrimination to minority students. Id. at 227; see also Terez, supra note 9, at 70 (advocating shifting of burden
to school board to show that its proposals conform to unitary schools concept). Note, supra
note 41, at 654 (under some circumstances, once control given back to school authorities,
burden of proof should be on school board); Note, The Unitary Finding and the Threat of
School Resegregation: Riddick v. School Board, 65 N.C.L. REV. 617, 638 (1987) (questioning
whether plaintiffs can meet burden of proving discriminatory intent in school system that is
already unitary); Note, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE L.J. 2003,
2020-21 (1990) (discussing difficulty of proving discriminatory intent since school boards
are likely to conceal it; suggesting use of circumstantial evidence of community sentiment
and acts by municipal officials as proof of school board's intent); Dowell failed to resolve the
issues of which party carries the burden of proof and what the burden should be. See Coyle,
School Ruling Leaves Burden on Lower Courts, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 5.
44 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.
1979).
See supra notes 24, 40-43 (discussing Tenth and Fourth Circuit approaches).
" Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1240.
47 Id. at 1241-42.
4" Id. at 1241. The court enumerated three factors to be considered in determining
whether a school system may be deemed unitary:
[1] "the nature and scope of the constitutional violation; [2] the remedial objective:
to restore, as nearly as possible, the victims of discrimination to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of illegal conduct; and [3) interests of state and
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."
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THE SUPREME COURT'S ATTEMPT AT COMPLIANCE

Five Interpretive Problems

Recognizing the need to resolve this conflict between the circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to the
Tenth Circuit in Board of Education v. Dowell.49 A review of the
decision, however, illustrates that it may actually raise more ques50
tions than answers.
First, the Court incorrectly states that under the Tenth Circuit
standard of unitariness set forth in Dowell, a "school district"
could be called unitary and nevertheless still contain vestiges of
past discrimination." 51 What the Tenth Circuit actually meant was
that a "particular educational area," for example student assignments, could be declared unitary, although the school district as a
whole contained vestiges of past discrimination.52 In support of
the proposition, the Tenth Circuit cited Morgan v. Nucci.53 In
Nucci, the First Circuit was extremely careful in pointing out that
the school district as a whole would not be declared unitary
merely because a particular educational area such as student assignments was unitary. 54 Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis of
the Tenth Circuit's standard was based on an incorrect interpretation of-what that standard required. This misinterpretation is particularly disturbing when one considers that, if anything, the
Tenth Circuit was more determined to actively enforce desegregation than the other circuits.55
Second, although the Supreme Court points out the differences
in the definitions of the terms "unitariness" and "dual system"
and acknowledges that this has fostered inconsistency in the use of
these terms by the lower courts, it does not attempt to resolve this
disparity nor does it set forth a clear definition to be used in fuId.
19 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635 (1991).
80 See infra notes 51-77 and accompanying text.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 635 (emphasis added).
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1499 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630
(1991).
'3 Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1499 (citing 831 F.2d 313 (Ist Cir. 1987)).
Nucci, 831 F.2d at 318-19.
Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1493 (school board must show that plan does not re-establish dual
system).
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ture cases."' Instead, the Court simply observed that it was "not
sure how useful it is to define these terms more precisely, or to
create subclasses within them.1 57 In so doing, the Court may have
impliedly done away with the use of the terms "unitary" and
"dual."" If this is what the Court intended, it should have done
so clearly and expressly since interpretation of these terms has
been the primary source of inconsistency and confusion in this
area, 9 indeed, the question of what constitutes unitariness has
been called the "central riddle" in desegregation cases.6" Indirectly disposing of the term "unitary" is especially inappropriate
considering that the Court has consistently used the term
throughout the relevant cases, and the term's elimination might
invalidate most, if not all, of the case law in this area.6 1 Thus, instead of resolving the inconsistencies in this area, the Court may
have added a new level of complexity to desegregation law. 62
" Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635-36 (1991).

" Id. at 636 (questioning usefulness of defining "unitary" and "dual system" more
precisely).
8

d.

See id. at 635-36. Many lower courts have used "unitary" in different and inconsistent
ways. Id.; see, e.g., Terez, supra note 9, at 57 (vague definition of "unitariness" results in
confusion and inconsistent decisions); Note, Unitary School Systems and Underlying Vestiges of
State-Imposed Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 794, 795 (1987) (meaning of "unitary" unclear,
and "premature finding of unitariness could lead to inadequate remedy") (citations omitted); Sherman, Classroom Bias Cases Continue, Nat'l L.J., (Jan. 11, 1988, at 24) (Supreme
Court has declined to address issue of "unitariness" in spite of split between circuits). But
see Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1970) (Burger, J., concurring)
("argument that the definition of unitary is unclear is unsupportable").
" Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 319 (1st Cir. 1987) ("question of what constitutes
unitariness [is] the central riddle of the law of school desegregation") (citing Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case: Its Significancefor Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. REV.
697, 700-01 (1971)).
"' See Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1666 (1990) (state policy which impedes operation of unitary system must be eliminated) (citing United States v. County of Macon, 99
U.S. 582 (1879)); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979) (district
court has broad power to create remedy assuring unitary system) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd, of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971)); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 276 (1977) (equal treatment of students facilitates conversion to unitary system).
"8 See Coalition to Save Our Children v. Delaware Bd. of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328, 349
(D. Del. 1991). In Coalition to Save Our Children, the district court concluded that there is
no longer a need to use the term "unitary." Id. (court dispensed with word "unitary" because Supreme Court in Dowell found lower courts' use of "unitary" inconsistent and confusing). It remains unclear whether the Supreme Court has in fact dispensed with the term
"unitary" entirely. It is likely that other courts may come to different conclusions as to the
ramifications of the Supreme Court's holding. Scholars have used the term "unitary" in
analyzing Dowell, suggesting that the Court may not have effectively done away with the
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Third, the Supreme Court stated that it was an error for the
63
court of appeals to apply the standard in United States v. Swift,
which dealt with injunctions in perpetuity, to a desegregation injunction, which is only a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.6 4 In describing the temporary nature of a desegregation decree, the Court stated that it would be dissolved "after the
local authorities have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time." 65 Although the Court identifies what happens
once a board is released from judicial control, 6 it never clearly
identifies what must occur for a board to be eligible for release.
Thus, the Supreme Court failed to answer the central issue in this
area which has divided the courts: "When does a district court's
' 67
jurisdiction over a school system end?
The fourth problem with the Dowell opinion is that it remands
the case to the district court to decide "whether the Board had
complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable. ' 6 8 This instruction, perhaps
the most significant part of the case, merely pieces together broad
language used time and again by many of the federal courts.69
term. See, e.g., Lively & Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudenceof Denial and Evasion, 40
AM. U.L. REV. 1307, 1325-26 n.88 (1991) ("unitary" system must be achieved to dissolve
desegregation decree) (citing Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991)); Note, RaceBased Faculty Hiring and Layoff Remedies in School Desegregation Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1917, 1918 n. 1I (1991) ("unitariness" determination requires district court to examine six
Green factors) (citing Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638); see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at A3,
col. 3 (unclear whether Supreme Court now intends to elaborate on terms "dual" and
"unitary" or to develop another framework for analyzing "the legacy of segregation").
6 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
6 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636-37.
Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
66 Id.

11 See id. at 638. From the Court's decision, a district court's jurisdiction over a school
system apparently ends upon a finding of constitutional compliance. See id. However, the
Court's opinion could also be interpreted to mean that a district court's jurisdiction ends
upon a finding of "unitariness" or upon compliance with the decree for a reasonable period of time. Id. at 636-37. The "reasonable period of time" standard seems to say that a
district court's jurisdiction could end even before "unitariness" is achieved as long as the
school board complies with the desegregation plan adopted. See id. at 637. Conceivably,
such "reasonable compliance" could take place even though the plan itself fails to completely desegregate the school system. The Court also failed to address whether "unitariness" should even be considered in this determination.
" Id. at 636-38.
09 See, e.g., South Park Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 453 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1981)
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The Court uses the phrases "good faith," 7 "vestiges of past discrimination,""' and "extent practicable ' "7 without defining what
(finding that authorities implemented plan in good faith); Estes v. NAACP, 444 U.S. 437,
440 (1980) (noting school board's good faith efforts to create unitary school system);
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1499 (10th Cir. 1989) (one factor court looks at
to determine if student assignments area is unitary is good faith of school board in desegregation effort and operation of schools), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); Monteilh v. Saint
Landry Parish School Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 1988) (school board acted in good
faith by treating all children in school system equally).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("racial distinctions are . .. highly relevant to . . . state objective of eliminating pernicious
vestiges of past discrimination"); Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1446 (11 th Cir. 1989)
(educational areas can be analyzed to determine whether all vestiges of past discrimination
have been eliminated from school system), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991); Monteilh,
848 F.2d at 629 (unitary means eliminating all vestiges of past discrimination); United
States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 1986) (state has duty to eliminate vestiges of
past discrimination). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 240
(1973) ("[B]oundaries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn to integrate to
the extent practicable, the school's student body."); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist.,
699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 679 F.2d
1104, 1114 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1,
429 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1970) (same); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd.,
514 F. Supp. 869, 873 (D. La. 1981) (same), affid, 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983).
70 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638. The term "good faith," as used by the courts, means good
faith compliance with a desegregation decree. Id. Yet the phrase could also impose a requirement that a court look to whether the school board acted with discriminatory intent.
See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987). If the school board is found to be
acting in good faith, it is unlikely that it is intentionally discriminating. Id. at 321. But see
Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1503 (fact that school board members acted in good faith does not
mean absence of discriminatory intent), rev'd, "111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). The Tenth Circuit in
Dowell considered intent to be irrelevant and focused instead on apparent changes in conditions which have taken place since the decree was entered. See id; at 1491.
71 Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638. Phrases to the same effect as "vestiges of past discrimination" were used by the Fourth Circuit in Riddick. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 534. Although it
may be that the Supreme Court was adopting the Riddick approach when it used this language, the Court's opinion does not mention Riddick, nor does it expressly approve of the
Riddick standard. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether Riddick is still good law after
Dowell.
Attorneys specializing in education law have also emphasized that Dowell did not clarify
the term "vestige of segregation" and that lower courts and subsequent decisions will have
to address "the extent to which educational vestiges and other types of harm must be remedied." See Tatel & Borkowski, Dowell Upheld Basic Principles, Left Hard Issues for Later
Cases, Nat'l L.J. Mar. 18, 1991, at 27. In addition, many commentators have criticized the
vague language used by the Dowell Court. See Coyle, School Ruling Leaves Burden on Lower
Courts, Nat'l L.J. Jan. 28, 1991, at 23 (emphasizing vagueness of term "vestiges of past
discrimination"); End to School Busing Eased, World News Digest, Jan. 17, 1991, at 35
[hereinafter End to School Busing Eased] (same); N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al, col. 3
(same).
" Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638. This language was used by the First Circuit in Morgan v.
Nucci and it may be that the Supreme Court was attempting to adopt the Nucci approach.
See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 324, 329 (1st Cir. 1987). Yet this is by no means clear
from the Court's directive, and Nucci is not cited for this proposition. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at
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they mean. Thus, the opinion did not resolve the conflicting interpretations which have arisen due to the ambiguity of these terms.
Fifth, by analogy to the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Spangler, the Dowell Court stated that, in order to terminate or
dissolve a desegregation decree, the respondents and the school
board are entitled to a precise statement from the court. 73 In
Spangler, the Court required a district court issuing a desegregation decree to provide the school board with a precise statement
of its obligations under the decree. 4 In Dowell, the Court discussed what statement is to be given when a desegregation decree
is terminated or dissolved. 75 Although the Court agreed that respondents and the school board were entitled to a precise statement, it failed to indicate or define what statement the district
court could have provided to satisfy this requirement. 76 Such lack
of guidance and vague terminology by the Court may have jeopardized whatever right or notice this "precise statement" was
meant to provide. 7
B.

A Better Approach

It is recognized that setting forth specific guidelines in the desegregation area is difficult because desegregation law is highly
controversial, politicized and fact-sensitive.78 The primary diffi638. The Court also fails to identify what steps a school board must take and what results
must be accomplished to reach "the extent practicable," nor does it indicate how much
money, time, and effort must be expended before a district court may properly conclude
that a school system is desegregated to "the extent practicable." Id.; see also End to School
Busing Eased, supra, at 35 (Dowell failed to define "practicable").
7' Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636.
See id. (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)).
'6 See id.
76 Id.

77 Id. The Court gave respondents the right to a precise statement that a decree is being
terminated, yet it did not indicate whether this means simple notice, or if a statement of
the reasons for the termination was required. Id.
" See Liebman, DesegregatingPolitics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1463, 1472 n.56 (1990). Liebman states that:
The problem . . . is that we are no longer certain what kind of question public
school desegregation really is. Twenty years ago we were convinced it was a matter
of showing southern school segregation to be morally wrong. But with busing, good
moral arguments exist on both sides. To the extent that desegregation has become
less a moral question, or at least more a moral standoff is it also less clearly a constitutional requirement the Supreme Court is entitled to impose?
Id.
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culty in formulating a standard is that the competing interests of
local authorities7" and minorities must be balanced in each case. 80
There may be no perfect solutions in the desegregation area in light of the demographic,
geographic, and sociological complexities of modern urban communities. See Estes v.
NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 448 (1979). Desegregation cases turn on close factual distinctions.
See Note, The Unitariness Finding, supra note 10, at 575. Thus, it is difficult to formulate
standards governing the appropriate time for courts to end their involvement in the desegregation process. Id. at 576.
70 See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 272 (1990) (citing Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)). In devising a solution to the problem of school segregation,
federal courts must consider "the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs consistent with the Constitution." Id.; see also Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v.
Evans, 446 U.S. 923, 926 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stressed the importance of local control:
The [Milliken] Court emphasized that "local control over the educational process
affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages experimentation, innovation and a healthy competition for educational excellence." The Court not only
emphasized these important benefits of local control, but also recognized the inability of courts and judges to assume that role, noting that "[t]his is a task which few, if
any, judges are qualified to perform."
Id. (quoting Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974)); see also Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (local authorities have primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving desegregation problems).
A number of federal courts have expressed the view that the judiciary should not intervene in the local or legislative arenas. See, e.g., Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 695 (5th Cir.
1990) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (judiciary not competent, nor appropriate institution to set educational policy); Lee v. Anniston City School
Sys., 737 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281) (although
federal courts have authority to ensure that unitariness is achieved, school authorities have
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing.and solving these problems); Lee v.
Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980) (elected or appointed authorities, not federal courts, should manage internal affairs of local school system); see also Rabkin, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv. 203, 248 n. 197 (control
over educational policy historically and constitutionally belongs to state and local school
authorities).
School boards mirror the will of the local community and are better able than courts to
make policy decisions regarding education. See Strossen, 'Secular Humanism' and 'Scientific
Creationism':Proposed Standardsfor Revising CurricularDecisions Affecting Students' Religious
Freedom, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 333, 354 (1986). Professional educators and elected officials have
more resources and expertise than the courts. Id. As a result, courts may lack the means to
articulate appropriate standards for resolving educational issues. Id. Finally, educational
institutions should be given wide discretion in managing educational affairs. Id. "Judicial
deference to educational decisions by state and local officials reflects several important traditions and concerns, including: preserving local democratic control over educational policy; protecting teachers' academic freedom; and maintaining policies that comport with the
views of educational experts." Id.; see also Flax v. Potts, 864 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir.
1989). Neighborhood schools make important contributions to the quality of education. Id.
For example, where less time is spent on local transportation, more time can be spent on
extracurricular activities and parental involvement programs. Id. In addition, money saved
from eliminating compulsory busing could be spent on primarily minority schools. Id.
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It is not enough for the standard adopted to be theoretically
sound; it must also take into account the practical realities of everyday life and provide an adequate plan of implementation."
Although a number of courts have grappled with this issue, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Morgan v.
Nucci and Morgan v. Burke, articulated a standard that is both equitable and functional. 82 In Nucci, the court held that the Constitution requires "maximum practicable desegregation" 8 in all eduThe Supreme Court's desegregation policy places the judiciary in conflict with the other
branches of government. See Devins, supra, note 2, at 42-43. The Court's extension of
desegregation law has been called "the worst sort of judicial overreaching." Id. Some commentators have speculated that this overreaching may provoke Congress into challenging
the existence of courts as institutions. Id. The limitations that desegregation law has placed
on the public school system "are both constitutionally unnecessary and educationally unsound." Id. As one commentator points out, judicial intervention in the public school system has been a recurring source of discontent and resentment. See Lively, The Effectuation
and Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern Problems in a Post-DesegregationSociety, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 117, 132 (1987). Many believe that by usurping legislative authority and interfering
with parental discretion, the Court's "active judicial role in promoting equal protection
objectives actually sacrifices them." Id.
" See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 486 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
"If public education is not to suffer further, we must return to a more balanced evaluation
of the recognized interests of our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert." Id.; see also R. SALAMONE,
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER LAw 49 (1986) (desegregation orders must balance societal, individual and community interests).
81 See Estes v. NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 448 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
emphasized that court orders designed to remedy constitutional violations must take into
account the particular circumstances present in each case and the alternative remedies
available. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Although it has only given general guidelines in this
area, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of "effectiveness and practicalities." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, according to justice Powell, the Court recognizes
that "perfect solutions may be unattainable in the context of the demographic, geographic
and sociological complexities of modern urban communities." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
This imperfection is demonstrated by the tendency of parents to enroll their children in
private schools, move to other communities, or refuse to move into a particular school
district. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
" Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Burke, 926 F.2d 86 (1st
Cir. 1991).
8" Nucci, 831 F.2d at 324. "[Mlaximum practicable desegregation" is the ultimate remedial goal in these cases. Id. at 322. "Both the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly stated that a judicially imposed desegregation remedy goes too far if it attempts to
engineer some sort of idealized racial balance in the schools." Id. at 325; see, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 910 (10th Cir. 1989) (realistic approach should be taken so
that courts do not intervene in local affairs any longer than necessary); Lee v. Macon City
Bd. of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 730, 738 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (agreeing with Morgan's incremental
approach to unitariness); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir.
1983) (whether public officials have eliminated segregation and its vestiges depends upon
conditions in district, achievements to date and feasibility of further measures). But see Pitts
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cational areas 8 and that a court's jurisdiction ends when a school
system is found to be unitary.8 6 In so doing, the court formulated
a practical standard, followed later in Morgan v. Burke, that minimizes court intervention in school affairs, yet protects the rights
of minority students guaranteed under. the equal protection
clause. 86
The Nucci-Burke standard takes an "incremental" approach to
unitariness 87 which further emphasizes the importance of returning control of educational policy to the local authorities.8 8
v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1446-47 (11 th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Morgan's holding permitting school systems to attain unitary status incrementally and stating that unitary status not
achieved until school system maintains at least three years of racial equality in six Green
areas), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991); Terez, supra note 9, at 60-61 (calling for elimination of all racially identifiable schools and permanent injunction requiring defendants to
establish and maintain unitary schools). See generally Gewirtz, supra note 9, at 778-79
(courts should consider plans which allow city students to transfer to suburban schools and
vice versa).
" See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (discussing the relevant six
educational areas). See also Dowell v. Board of Ed., 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991) (quoting
Green factors); supra note 31 and accompanying text (Dowell v. Board of Ed., 111 S. Ct.
630, 638 (1991) (quoting Green factors)). The unitariness of each separate factor must be
considered individually. See Nucci, 831 F.2d at 319. In Nucci, the court stated that in order
to determine whether student assignments have achieved this status, the court must apply
the standard of "maximum practicable desegregation." Id. In addition, a court must look
to: (1) the number of one-race or racially identifiable schools; and (2) whether the school
board has shown good faith in implementing the desegregation plan and in operating the
schools. Id.
" See Nucci, 831 F.2d at 318 (consequences of unitariness is "mandatory devolution of
power to local authorities").
" Id. at 324-25 (realistic, not idealistic desegregation is goal); see also Burke, 926 F.2d at
92.
87 See id. at 318 (incremental approach espoused); see also Burke, 926 F.2d at 92.
Nucci, 831 F.2d at 324-25 (court should not intervene in school affairs any longer than
necessary).
Like Nucci, Riddick recognizes the importance of the role of local authorities in the educational process. See Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir.) ("[nlo
one seriously disputes that public education has traditionally been a local concern") (citing
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). That is
why the district court's role ends once a school system is found to be unitary and control
over the system must be returned to local authorities. Id. at 535. See South Park Indep.
School Dist. v. United States, 453 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1980) (once school system declared
unitary, district court's jurisdiction terminates); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
439 (1968) (court should retain jurisdiction until state-imposed segregation completely
eliminated); Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1990) (court must stop supervising
school board policy once need to oversee it ends); United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d
1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (district court jurisdiction must end when school system found
unitary); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985) (district court's
jurisdiction not perpetual and terminates when school system achieves unitary status) (citations omitted); Beard, supra note 27, at 1286 (once school system becomes unitary, all in-
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Under this approach, once a school board achieves a unitariness
in one or more areas, those areas are returned to local control
without necessarily waiting to achieve unitariness in the entire
school system.8 9
The Nucci-Burke standard also points out that unitariness is not
achieved at the "magical moment" 90 when the school board has
technically complied with part of the decree, for example, by
meeting the desired white-to-minority student ratio for the first
time." The standard calls for limited judicial monitoring over a
school board for a three-year period after it has technically comjunctions should be dissolved and case should be terminated).
The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, seems to encourage judicial overreaching by allowing
district courts to supervise the educational process for an indefinite period of time. Dowell,
890 F.2d at 1492 (finding of unitariness does not mandate dissolution of decree without
proof of "substantial change in the circumstances which led to the issuance of that decree")
(citations omitted), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). The chief criticism of the Tenth Circuit
approach is that the court unnecessarily encroaches upon the power of local authorities to
operate their own school systems even after the constitutional violation has been cured. See
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 483 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). In a
vigorous dissent, Justice Powell argued that judicial intrusion on local and professional authorities would have an adverse effect upon the quality of public education. Id. He pointed
out that the reorganization of the affected school systems in this case would require the
busing of 111,000 students, the reassignment of faculty and staff and the closing of a number of schools. Id. In his view, these changes ignored the substantial educational and economic reasons against dismantling local school structures. Id. He charged the majority with
engaging in "judicial legislation" by substituting its views for those of the legislature and of
seriously interfering with private decisionmaking. Id. at 483-84. Justice Powell concluded
that "[tlhese harmful consequences are the inevitable by-products of a judicial approach
that ignores other relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance in every
school." Id. at 484.
99 Nucci, 831 F.2d at 318. As stated by the First Circuit in Morgan v. Burke, a companion
case to Nucci, "the achievement of unitariness in [each individual] sector can be judged
independently of progress or lack thereof in other sectors." Burke, 926 F.2d at 92 (citing
Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318-19 (1st Cir. 1987)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 19, 1991 to the appellant in Pitts v. Freeman. See Pitts v. Freeman, 887
F.2d 1438 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991). Freeman presents an issue
on which the circuits have split: whether a school district can be unitary with respect to
some of its operations and not others. See Tatel & Borkowski, supra note 71, at 27. In
contrast to Nucci, Freeman held that integration could not be achieved on a piecemeal basis.
See Freeman, 887 F.2d. at 1446. By granting certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court implicitly recognized that several important issues were left unresolved by Dowell. See
Tatel & Borkowski, supra note 71, at 27; see also Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup,
Court to Review Case from Georgia on Desegregation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al, col. 3
(Supreme Court's decision to hear Freeman may be result of Dowell's failure to provide
much guidance to school districts and federal judges).
o Burke, 926 F.2d at 91.
91 Id.
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plied with the student-assignment portion of the decree.9" It is
only when the school board has complied with the student-assignment portion of the decree for the three-year period, that unitariness is achieved. 3 Once maximum practical desegregation is
reached in a particular educational area, for example, student assignments, and thus the three-year probationary period has necessarily expired, unitariness is achieved and the district court's jurisdiction over that particular educational area terminates.9 4 The
92 Morgan v. Burke, 926 F.2d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Nucci, 831 F.2d at 326.
During the three year probationary period, the Board would submit annual or biannual
progress reports to the district court to assure that the prior segregatory patterns had not
resurfaced. See id. at 316 (stating that district court required board to submit semi-annual
reports); see also United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 230
(1969) (requiring school boards to submit annual reports to court); United States v. DeSoto
Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 809 n.1 1 (5th Cir. 1978) (same) (citing United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 982 (1978)). The DeSoto court noted that "[s]uch a requirement had long been
the practice in school cases." Id. Were it not for this discretion, "the entire exercise . . .
could well prove to have been a painful charade." Burke, 926 F.2d at 91. The First Circuit
in Burke emphasized that such monitoring has been employed in both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Id. (citing Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate School Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 752
(5th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983);
Freeman, 887 F.2d at 1446 n.9). These circuits have had "perhaps the most comprehensive
and intensive experience in desegregation litigation." Id.; see also Nucci, 831 F.2d at 326.
This is a reasonable compromise between the Riddick view that court intervention should
end immediately at the point of unitariness and the Tenth Circuit's view that it should last
indefinitely. See supra note 88. Critics may argue that a school board could wait out the
three year probationary period and then segregate again. This is unlikely in light of the
fact that the particular educational area would be fully integrated at the time it is declared
unitary. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Thus, minority administrators and staff
members would be able to resist any attempts at resegregation either at the local level or
by bringing a new lawsuit against the school board. The potential for such suits is a powerful deterrent against intentional resegregation since the lawsuits are quite lengthy and, if
the school board loses, it will-be forced to implement a new plan which can be extremely
costly in terms of dollars, time, and effort. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 439 U.S.
1348, 1352 (1978). The Supreme Court emphasized the high costs of desegregation activities which include:
inventory, packing, and moving of furniture, textbooks, equipment, and supplies;
completion of pupil reassignments, bus routes and schedules, and staff and administrative reassignments; construction of bus storage and maintenance facilities; hiring
and training of new bus drivers; and notification to parents of pupil reassignments
and bus information. Most important . . . there will occur the personal dislocations
that accompany the actual reassignment of 42,000 students, 37,000 of whom will be
transported by bus. The Columbus school system has severe financial difficulties. It is
estimated that for calendar year 1978 the system will have a cash deficit of $9.5
million, $7.3 million of which is calculated to be desegregation expenses.
Id.
" Burke, 926 F.2d at 91.
04 Id.

329

Journal of Legal Commentary

Vol. 6: 311, 1991

district court would retain jurisdiction over other educational areas which had not yet complied with the decree for the requisite
three-year probationary period. 9 In this way, unitariness would
be achieved separately in each of the six educational areas mentioned in Dowell."
Admittedly, the Nucci-Burke standard is not perfect since it does
not precisely define the phrase "maximum practicable desegregation."11 7 However, it does emphasize the need for the remedy to
be practical and not merely theoretical. 9 8 From this it may be argued that "maximum practicable desegregation" takes into account the resources of the individual school and the "demographic, geographic and sociological complexities" of the
community.9 9 This is a reasonable approach that is fair to all concerned because, while it requires the school board to desegregate
to the extent practicable, it does not impose an insurmountable
burden on the board which far exceeds the social ill it was
designed to remedy.1"' Objective evidence, such as financial statements, maps and census data, will assist a court in assessing the
practical realities of the situation. °
Finally, the Nucci-Burke standard stresses what so many courts
02
have failed to recognize, namely, that a court's power is limited1
in this area because "the scope of the remedy is determined by
the nature and the extent of the constitutional violation."' 0 3
95 Id.

" Id.; see Dowell v. Board of Educ., 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991) (quoting Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (six factors)).
' Nucci, 831 F.2d at 324.
98 Id.
" See supra note 81 (advocating balanced evaluation of societal and educational interests
in achieving desegregation).
100 Nucci, 831 F.2d at 324-25.
101 Id. at 319. Justice Powell emphasized that the demographic and economic realities of
cities must be taken into consideration in the desegregation area. Id.
10. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 632 (1990) (remedial powers of
equity court not unlimited); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 2223 (1971) (desegregation cases should not be used for purposes beyond their scope, they
cannot embrace all problems of racial prejudice); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451, 477 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (court's preference should not displace local
school board plans where it would only provide small change in racial composition).
"' Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 16. Allowing local school districts
to retain their autonomy has been called a "vital national tradition." Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 439 U.S. 1348, 1353 (1979) (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 410 (1977)). School desegregation decrees are a critical limitation of that tradi-
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Courts have so consistently issued overbroad desegregation decrees, that an argument maybe made that this is an area best left
to local authorities who have traditionally used their training and
expertise to oversee education.'" Local authorities can debate,
discuss and formulate appropriate guidelines in this area of the
law." 5 If the authority enacts a plan that is unconstitutional or
fails to affirmatively desegregate when ordered to do so, it is only
then that the courts should get involved.'
CONCLUSION

Although Dowell sets out to resolve the inconsistencies and confusion in the area of desegregation, the decision raises more questions than it answers. It fails to define what constitutes a unitary
school system and to identify what are the consequences of being
declared unitary. The direction given by the Court only complicates the area further by using vague terminology without explanation. It is submitted that the courts should follow the NucciBurke standard adopted by the First Circuit because it is fair and
equitable to all concerned and it recognizes the important role
that local authorities play in educating this nation's young people.
tion because they often require a change in the structure of the educational system. Id.
"[J]udicial imposition on this established province of the community is only proper in the
face of factual proof of constitutional violations and then only to the extent necessary to
remedy the effect of those violations." Id. A court's role is to correct constitutional violations by balancing individual and collective interests. See Alexis I. DuPont School Dist. v.
Evans, 439 U.S. 1375, 1377-78 (1978) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). "Remedial judicial
authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers
are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults." Id. (quoting
Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). See Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1990) (remedies must
be narrowly tailored to meet scope of violation).
1" See Penick, 443 U.S. at 487-88 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell disapproved of
courts' issuing overbroad decrees and engaging in "ongoing supervision over school systems." Id. at 487. (Powell, J., dissenting). He pointed out that many legislatures may welcome judicial intervention for the very reason that this is a complex and highly controversial area. Id. In his view, the judiciary was the "branch least competent to provide longrange solutions acceptable to the public and most conducive to achieving both diversity in
the classroom and quality education." Id. at 488 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Dozier v.
Chupka, 763 F. Supp. 1430, 1435 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("court's role has always been that of
an overseer of a temporary judicial remedy, not that of a coparticipant with city government in the establishment of executive policy and execution of legislative decisionmaking").
1"8 See supra note 79 (emphasizing important role local and legislative authorities play in
educational process).
'" Id. (same).
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Since education is "the very foundation of good citizenship," application of the Nucci-Burke standard in desegregation cases may
lead to the ultimate goal of a successful and equal society.
Kevin P. Fitzspatrick & Lynne E. Trimble
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